The five books on Ancient Philosophy reviewed here range from a Presocratic reader that includes nearly all the extant literature followed by extensive discussion, a large reader with little commentary that spans the Presocratics to Aristotle, a sourcebook for scholars on Peripatetic philosophy from 200 BC to AD 200, an introductory interpretive book on the Presocratics drawing on selected passages, and an interpretive introduction to Stoicism that at the same time advocates for Stoicism contemporary life. The same general pattern is (...) followed for each book’s review: (a) the book’s contents, including a note on new material if the book is a later edition, a brief account of the preface and other preliminary material, a list of chapter headings and/or subjects, and supplemental end-material; (b) a summary of themes and topics, and where relevant the main theses; (d) an evaluation of the book’s success in regard to its explicit or implicit purpose and audience; and (e) an assessment of the book’s pedagogical value for a range of students. (shrink)

The five books on Ancient Philosophy reviewed here range from a Presocratic reader that includes nearly all the extant literature followed by extensive discussion, a large reader with little commentary that spans the Presocratics to Aristotle, a sourcebook for scholars on Peripatetic philosophy from 200 BC to AD 200, an introductory interpretive book on the Presocratics drawing on selected passages, and an interpretive introduction to Stoicism that at the same time advocates for Stoicism contemporary life. The same general pattern is (...) followed for each book’s review: (a) the book’s contents, including a note on new material if the book is a later edition, a brief account of the preface and other preliminary material, a list of chapter headings and/or subjects, and supplemental end-material; (b) a summary of themes and topics, and where relevant the main theses; (d) an evaluation of the book’s success in regard to its explicit or implicit purpose and audience; and (e) an assessment of the book’s pedagogical value for a range of students. (shrink)

To properly understand behavior, we must obtain both ultimate and proximate explanations. Put briefly, ultimate explanations are concerned with why a behavior exists, and proximate explanations are concerned with how it works. These two types of explanation are complementary and the distinction is critical to evolutionary explanation. We are concerned that they have become conflated in some areas of the evolutionary literature on human behavior. This article brings attention to these issues. We focus on three specific areas: the evolution of (...) cooperation, transmitted culture, and epigenetics. We do this to avoid confusion and wasted effort—dangers that are particularly acute in interdisciplinary research. Throughout this article, we suggest ways in which misunderstanding may be avoided in the future. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2018 Heft: 225 Seiten: 19-38.

This article demonstrates how Peirce’s core definition of Index extends even to Objects which do not co-occur in space and time with their referent. Although the arguments are philosophical in nature, they are supported by developmental and empirical findings. The case of absent Objects as constituting Objects of indexical use is the primary focus; and rationale is offered from Peirce’s early and later work to bolster this claim. The analysis proffers the bold assertion that Index, especially in its Degenerate use (...) without an Interpretant, qualifies as the most primary sign vehicle, and that Index to absent Objects determines whether indexical use is Degenerate or Genuine. (shrink)

Natural myside bias is the tendency to evaluate propositions from within one's own perspective when given no instructions or cues (such as within-participants conditions) to avoid doing so. We defined the participant's perspective as their previously existing status on four variables: their sex, whether they smoked, their alcohol consumption, and the strength of their religious beliefs. Participants then evaluated a contentious but ultimately factual proposition relevant to each of these demographic factors. Myside bias is defined between-participants as the mean difference (...) in the evaluation of the proposition between groups with differing prior status on the variable. Whether an individual difference variable (such as cognitive ability) is related to the magnitude of the myside bias is indicated by whether the individual difference variable interacts with the between-participants status variable. In two experiments involving a total of over 1400 university students ( n = 1484) and eight different comparisons, we found very little evidence that participants of higher cognitive ability displayed less natural myside bias. The degree of myside bias was also relatively independent of individual differences in thinking dispositions. We speculate that ideas from memetic theory and dual-process theory might help to explain why natural myside bias is quite dissociated from individual difference variables. (shrink)

The widely cited Nuffield Council on Bioethics ‘Intervention Ladder’ structurally embodies the assumption that personal autonomy is maximized by non-intervention. Consequently, the Intervention Ladder encourages an extreme ‘negative liberty’ view of autonomy. Yet there are several alternative accounts of autonomy that are both arguably superior as accounts of autonomy and better suited to the issues facing public health ethics. We propose to replace the one-sided ladder, which has any intervention coming at a cost to autonomy, with a two-sided ‘Balanced Intervention (...) Ladder,’ where intervention can either enhance or diminish autonomy. We show that not only the alternative, richer accounts of autonomy but even Mill’s classic version of negative liberty puts some interventions on the positive side of the ladder. (shrink)

We did not, as Brakel & Shevrin imply, intend to classify either System 1 or System 2 as rational or irrational. Instrumental rationality is assessed at the organismic level, not at the subpersonal level. Thus, neither System 1 nor System 2 are themselves inherently rational or irrational. Also, that genetic fitness and instrumental rationality are not to be equated was a major theme in our target article. We disagree with Bringsjord & Yang's point that the tasks used in the heuristics (...) and biases literature are easy. Bringsjord & Yang too readily conflate the ability to utilize a principle of rational choice with the disposition to do so. Thus, they undervalue tasks in the cognitive science literature that compellingly reveal difficulties with the latter. We agree with Newton & Roberts that models at the algorithmic level of analysis are crucial, but we disagree with their implication that attention to issues of rationality at the intentional level of analysis impedes work at the algorithmic level of analysis. (shrink)

Individual differences on a variety of framing and conjunction problems were examined in light of Slovic and Tversky's (1974) understanding/acceptance principle-that more reflective and skilled reasoners are more likely to affirm the axioms that define normative reasoning and to endorse the task construals of informed experts. The predictions derived from the principle were confirmed for the much discussed framing effect in the Disease Problem and for the conjunction fallacy on the Linda Problem. Subjects of higher cognitive ability were disproportionately likely (...) to avoid each fallacy. Other framing problems produced much more modest levels of empirical support. It is conjectured that the varying patterns of individual differences are best explained by two-process theories of reasoning (e.g. Evans, 1984, 1996; Sloman, 1996) conjoined with the assumption that the two processes differentially reflect interactional and analytic intelligence. (shrink)

The Term ‘liberty’ invokes such universal respect that most modern political economists and moralists endeavour to find a conspicuous place for it somewhere in their systems or prescriptions. But in view of the innumerable senses of this term an insistence on some kind of definition prior to any discussion seems to be justified. For our present purposes attention to two particularly conflicting interpretations will be sufficient. These are sometimes called the ‘negative’ and the ‘positive’ notions of Liberty. According to the (...) ‘negative’ notion, my own liberty implies the reduction to a minimum of the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which I wish to act. Conversely the absence of liberty, or coercion, is regarded as undesirable because it amounts to the prevention by other persons of my doing what I want. On the other hand, the ‘positive’ sense of the word ‘liberty’ consists in the attainment of self-mastery, or, in other words, the release from the domination of ‘adverse’ influences. This ‘slavery’ from which men ‘liberate’ themselves is variously described to include slavery to ‘nature’, to ‘unbridled passions’, to ‘irrational impulses’, or simply slavery to one's ‘lower nature’. ‘Positive’ liberty is then identified with ‘self-realisation’ or an awakening into a conscious state of rationality. The fact that it is contended that such a state can often be attained only by the interference of other ‘rational’ persons who ‘liberate’ their fellow beings from their ‘irrationality’, brings this interpretation of liberty into open and striking conflict with liberty in the ‘negative’ sense. (shrink)

This account will demonstrate that the element of surprise is a fundamental device in establishing double consciousness regimes; it further shows how such dialogic paradigms foster abductive inferences by filtering out irrelevant percepts/antecedents. The account sets up Peirce’s Pheme to be the primary device which shocks interpreters’ sensibilities – starting them on a course to question conflicting principles between ego and non-ego. The natural disposition of surprise to instantaneously deliver insight into which antecedents are relevant to vital, anomalous consequences demonstrates (...) its indispensability in generating logical and semiotic advances. For Peirce, vividness, as an element of surprise in Secondness, is largely responsible for the nuts and bolts of how surprise facilitates logic; its means to activate searches for plausible antecedents makes vividness the prime candidate. The success of vividness at turning the mind of interpreters to new ways of explaining the consequence largely hinges upon the external properties of the unexpected consequence – not merely objects’ instantaneity, but their striking characteristics, as well. Even though vividness is external, it produces internal responses, in the form of a war against feelings. In this way, double consciousness paradigms are initiated, which, in turn, call for hypothesis generation. (shrink)

Esta investigação ilustra como o Interpretante energético de Peirce facilita a conscientização entre os usuários de signos. Peirce caracteriza o Interpretante energético/existencial como “empenho” e “esforço”. Por forçar a atenção e a progressão da ação, o Interpretante energético destaca as relações de signos atomísticos/pontuais de causa e efeito apresentando junções entre os eventos: começo, meio e fim. A Primeiridade e a Terceiridade subjacentes perpetuam ainda mais o componente pontual presente nas relações de ação, operacional quando o esforço produz resistência contra (...) um sentimento/força oposta. O esforço é, no entanto, apenas um lado do Interpretante energético de Peirce; o lado oposto ocorre quando os elementos externos têm um papel mais ativo na destruição de crenças/ações anteriores. Os Interpretantes energéticos podem inibir, ou seja, resultar em atenção a um estímulo, enquanto ignoram outro. No entanto, inibir/resistir conscientemente a uma força introduz o controle além de si mesmo—reflexos do outro sobre os atos conscientes de um agente. Essa influência entre interlocutores satisfaz a máxima de Peirce de um “lugar comum para ficar”, demonstrando compreensão mútua do efeito próprio do signo. De fato, os Interpretantes energéticos podem resultar em um efeito de tal proporção sobre um ou ambos os interlocutores que uma mudança de hábito se materialize. Assim, os Interpretantes energéticos condensam a perfectividade exercida por esforços particulares, sugerindo a probabilidade de seu sucesso discursivo. (shrink)

The objective in this paper is to demonstrate the indispensability of Peirce’s double consciousness to foster abductive reasoning, so that internal/external dialogue inform the worthiness of hunches. These forms of dialogue establish a mental give-and-take forum in which novel meanings/effects are particularly highlighted and noticed. Such attentional shifts are compelled by surprising states of affairs within the beholder’s internal, interpretive competencies, or from external factors (pictures, gestural or linguistic performatives). The dialogic nature of these signs pre-forms operations not possible non-dialogically; (...) they command, interrogate, or suggest alterations to established conduct/beliefs in contexts in which propositional/argumentative conflicts are obviated. This inquiry proposes experimental methodologies to measure when double consciousness (via private/inner speech) mediates hypothesis-making. Vygotsky’s conflict of motive at four distinct developmental stages constitutes the foundation for the proposed experiments. Designs draw upon Vygotsky’s ‘double stimulation’ paradigms that force decision-making processes when conflicts of motive surface. Paradigms include forced imitation of one model while ignoring another (imitating bear, not dragon), and altering a visual array to depict logical sequencing accurately (the “Cycles Test”; “The Odd One Out”). These conflicts require children to change their conduct/beliefs to accommodate to atypical states of affairs. (shrink)

Th is inquiry outlines Karl Buhler’s three kinds of deixis, focusing particularly on his most advanced use – deixis am phantasma (deictics to refer to absentreferents). This use is of primary import to the semiosis of index, given the centrality of the object and the interpretant in changing the function of the indexical sign in ontogeny. Employing deictic signs to refer to absent objects (some of which are mental) constitutes a catalyst from more social, conventional, uses to more internal, imaginative, (...) ones. Buhler’s analogy of mental objects as a “mimesis” serves as the genesis for the claim that static and more dynamic memories, fuelled by affect, drive deictics to refer to more dynamic objects and more dynamic interpretants, into more constructed realities. Peirce’s two types of objects and three types of interpretants complete Buhler’s deictic framework; they determine advances in deictic semiosis undeveloped by Buhler, and offer rationale for how it is that deictic use extends the semiosis of index. (shrink)

This article demonstrates how Peirce’s core definition of Index extends even to Objects which do not co-occur in space and time with their referent. Although the arguments are philosophical in nature, they are supported by developmental and empirical findings. The case of absent Objects as constituting Objects of indexical use is the primary focus; and rationale is offered from Peirce’s early and later work to bolster this claim. The analysis proffers the bold assertion that Index, especially in its Degenerate use (...) without an Interpretant, qualifies as the most primary sign vehicle, and that Index to absent Objects determines whether indexical use is Degenerate or Genuine. (shrink)

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century the name of Adam Smith was popularly associated with the sort of ‘laissez faire’ policy that is expounded with all the fervour of a religious faith. Smith, so the story ran, in his eagerness to combat the excessive mercantilist government intervention of his day, had resorted to supra-natural claims in his general onslaught against central control and planning by governments. Such intervention was ‘unnatural’ and conflicted with Deistic Design. Only through private actions (...) could mankind reach satisfying and ‘natural’ fulfillment. Action through private self-interest was twice blessed; it. blessed him who profited and his fellows who were ‘profited from’. True there was a kind of central planning that was of supreme importance; but it had a divine origin and it worked not through governments but through individual free trade. Private actions in fact were directed by an Invisible Hand which brought society into a grand and spontaneous Natural Harmony. (shrink)

Dans cette enquête, j’affirme que les signes occupent une place centrale dans la cosmologie de Peirce, et que le fait de soutenir de nouvelles propositions à travers le dialogue a le pouvoir de favoriser l’unité nécessaire pour souder les membres de son continuum. Le dialogue tel que conçu par Peirce devient le moyen de souder chaque membre du continuum. Le principal moteur dans la réalisation de cette «soudure», selon Peirce, est le hasard/l’habitude dans l’utilisation des signes elle-même. Bien que la (...) place du soi, conçu comme une expression de toutes les composantes du monde physique, sera considérée, je m’intéresserai principalement aux changements logiques constatés par le passage du dialogue inter-actionnel au dialogue intra-actionnel. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2014 Heft: 202 Seiten: 459-480.

Peirce’s Pheme directs interpretation of narratives via a “series of surprises” (ep2:154). The indexical and iconic elements inherent in Phemes are particularly potent in forcing attention and depicting relevant events. Index intrudes upon interpreters’ consciousness to notice the unexpected consequence; but icons exploit vividness. As imperatives, Phemes compel particular behaviors (1906: ms295). When narratives are portrayed in pictures, interpreters remember happenings in which Phemes feature surprising percepts, evoking an attentional response, and securing a confluence of events in memory. Findings from (...) children’s narrations demonstrate that events represented by Phemes are more often included in children’s retellings, because surprising images command active participation. This viewpoint impels listeners to build episodes, ascribing meanings across events, and proposing rationale for novel outcomes. (shrink)

This inquiry illustrates how Peirce’s Energetic Interpretant facilitates consciousness-raising between sign users. Because it forces attention and progression of action, the Energetic Interpretant highlights perfective aspectual characteristics, namely atomistic/punctual cause-effect sign relations by featuring junctures between events: beginning, middle, end. For example, the stops and starts of events are influenced by the nature of the action, in addition to the agent’s idiosyncratic preferences and predilections. The Thirdness underlying it further perpetuates the punctual component present in action relations, operational when effort (...) produces resistance against an opposing force. Because effort can materialize physically, or internally, it demonstrates the continued primacy of Peirce’s categories in fostering certain consequences. Energetic Interpretants can inhibit, i.e., attention to one stimulus, while ignoring another. Nonetheless, consciously inhibiting/resisting a force introduces control beyond the self—another’s reflections upon the conscious acts of an agent. This influence between interlocutors satisfies Peirce’s maxim of a “common place to stand”, demonstrating mutual comprehension of the sign’s proper effect. In fact, Energetic Interpretants may result in an effect of such proportion upon either or both interlocutors that a habit-change materializes. As such, Energetic Interpretants epitomize the perfectivity exercised by particular efforts, intimating the likelihood of their discursive success. Inherent in punctual events is the element of surprise, which ultimately hastens the kind of habit-change especially exhibited in Peirce’s double consciousness —self talking to self or other. (shrink)

This article demonstrates how Peirce’s core definition of Index extends even to Objects which do not co-occur in space and time with their referent. Although the arguments are philosophical in nature, they are supported by developmental and empirical findings. The case of absent Objects as constituting Objects of indexical use is the primary focus; and rationale is offered from Peirce’s early and later work to bolster this claim. The analysis proffers the bold assertion that Index, especially in its Degenerate use (...) without an Interpretant, qualifies as the most primary sign vehicle, and that Index to absent Objects determines whether indexical use is Degenerate or Genuine. (shrink)

Th is inquiry outlines Karl Buhler’s three kinds of deixis, focusing particularly on his most advanced use – deixis am phantasma (deictics to refer to absentreferents). This use is of primary import to the semiosis of index, given the centrality of the object and the interpretant in changing the function of the indexical sign in ontogeny. Employing deictic signs to refer to absent objects (some of which are mental) constitutes a catalyst from more social, conventional, uses to more internal, imaginative, (...) ones. Buhler’s analogy of mental objects as a “mimesis” serves as the genesis for the claim that static and more dynamic memories, fuelled by affect, drive deictics to refer to more dynamic objects and more dynamic interpretants, into more constructed realities. Peirce’s two types of objects and three types of interpretants complete Buhler’s deictic framework; they determine advances in deictic semiosis undeveloped by Buhler, and offer rationale for how it is that deictic use extends the semiosis of index. (shrink)

Th is inquiry outlines Karl Buhler’s three kinds of deixis, focusing particularly on his most advanced use – deixis am phantasma (deictics to refer to absentreferents). This use is of primary import to the semiosis of index, given the centrality of the object and the interpretant in changing the function of the indexical sign in ontogeny. Employing deictic signs to refer to absent objects (some of which are mental) constitutes a catalyst from more social, conventional, uses to more internal, imaginative, (...) ones. Buhler’s analogy of mental objects as a “mimesis” serves as the genesis for the claim that static and more dynamic memories, fuelled by affect, drive deictics to refer to more dynamic objects and more dynamic interpretants, into more constructed realities. Peirce’s two types of objects and three types of interpretants complete Buhler’s deictic framework; they determine advances in deictic semiosis undeveloped by Buhler, and offer rationale for how it is that deictic use extends the semiosis of index. (shrink)

Implementation of Solar Thermal Technology describes the successes and failures of the commercialization efforts of the U.S. solar thermal energy program, from the oil embargo of 1973 through the demise of the program in the early Reagan administration and its afterlife since then. The emphasis throughout is on lessons learned from the solar experience, with an eye toward applications to other projects as well as toward possible renewal of efforts at commercialization. Part I discusses the history of government involvement in (...) solar development and the parallel development of the market for solar products. Part II looks at the histories of specific commercialization programs for five areas. Parts III-VIII focus in turn on demonstration and construction projects, quality assurance, information dissemination programs, efforts to transfer technology to industry, incentive programs, and organizational support. Solar Heat Technologies: Fundamentals and Applications, Volume 10. (shrink)

"Essays explore philosophical themes in the Wizard of Oz saga, comprising the books by L. Frank Baum, the 1939 film, the novel Wicked, and related films and ...

Source: Author: Uzoamaka S. Chigbu, Chijindu Promise Ubah, Ezeji E. Chigbu The level of bank development has a determinant effect on the growth potentials of a developing economy. In response, this study examined the impact of banking sector development on foreign investment inflows in the West African countries of Nigeria and Ghana. The study relied on secondary data for analysis and made use of multiple regression technique. However, to ensure the authenticity of our result, Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test (...) and Johansen Cointegration techniques were respectively employed to test for the presence unit root and long-run equilibrium relationship in the exogenous variables. Additionally, causal relationships were tested with Granger Causality. It was revealed that banking sector development has a significant influence on foreign investment inflows in the two West African countries. Specifically, domestic credit to private sector and bank deposit rate has significant influence on foreign investment inflows in both countries. Whereas domestic credit to private sector is directly related to the dependent variable in Ghana, it is related inversely in Nigeria. It was also discovered that bank lending rate is significantly and positively related to foreign investment in Ghana. Intermediation efficiency and profitability of banks should be improved by enhancing the capital structure and adopting the appropriate lending rate especially in Nigeria as measures to attract more inflows of foreign investment in both countries. ]]>. (shrink)

One of the most important theoretical and ideological tasks of Marxist philosophy is the critical study of the philosophical thought of the West. In the second half of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, the ideological struggle on the international arena entered a new stage. It was characterized by the turn of the forces of imperialist reaction away from the politics of detente to the politics of the "cold war," to the active opposition to the forces of peace, (...) democracy, and socialism. The struggle of ideas has swung back and forth in the context of, on the one hand, a resurgence of reactionary anticommunist tendencies, and the stimulation and expansion of antimilitary movements and the struggles of the peoples for peace and socialism on the other. (shrink)

Taking Emerson as his starting point, Cornel West’s basic task in this ambitious enterprise is to chart the emergence, development, decline, and recent resurgence of American pragmatism. John Dewey is the central figure in West’s pantheon of pragmatists, but he treats as well such varied mid-century representatives of the tradition as Sidney Hook, C. Wright Mills, W. E. B. Du Bois, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Lionel Trilling. West’s "genealogy" is, ultimately, a very personal work, for it is imbued (...) throughout with the author’s conviction that a thorough reexamination of American pragmatism may help inspire and instruct contemporary efforts to remake and reform American society and culture. "West... may well be the pre-eminent African American intellectual of our generation."—The Nation "_The American Evasion of Philosophy_ is a highly intelligent and provocative book. Cornel West gives us illuminating readings of the political thought of Emerson and James; provides a penetrating critical assessment of Dewey, his central figure; and offers a brilliant interpretation—appreciative yet far from uncritical—of the contemporary philosopher and neo-pragmatist Richard Rorty.... What shines through, throughout the work, is West's firm commitment to a radical vision of a philosophic discourse as inextricably linked to cultural criticism and political engagement."—Paul S. Boyer, professor emeritus of history, University of Wisconsin–Madison. Wisconsin Project on American Writers Frank Lentricchia, General Editor. (shrink)

In her last known piece of work Lady Mary Shepherd’s Metaphysics (1832), Mary Shepherd writes that “mind, may inhere in definite portions of matter […] or of infinite space” (LMSM 699). Shepherd thus suggests that a mind – a “capacity for sensation in general” (e.g., EPEU 16) – may have a spatial location. This is prima facie surprising given that she is committed to the view that the mind is unextended. In this paper, we argue that Shepherd can consistently honor (...) both of these commitments. We argue, first, that even though finite minds, due to their unextendedness cannot, to use Shepherd’s term, ‘occupy’ space as material bodies do, such minds can nonetheless be said to have a spatial location in virtue of what we call their presence, or what Shepherd calls ‘inherence’, in a material body. Second, we argue that, in a similar way, the divine mind is present throughout the whole of space and is thus omnipresent. We then argue that, in contrast to finite minds, the divine mind does not require a body to be present in space. Rather, we contend, God’s omnipresence might be best understood in a ‘holenmerist’ sense, where the divine mind is wholly present in every part of creation. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to outline Dorothy Emmet’s (1904-2000) account of perception in The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking (published in 1945). Emmet’s account of perception is part of a wider attempt to rehabilitate metaphysics in the face of logical positivism and verificationism (of the kind espoused most famously by A. J. Ayer). It is thus part of an attempt to stem the tide of anti-metaphysical thought that had become widespread in British philosophy by the middle of the twentieth (...) century. In pursuit of that aim, Emmet draws on the work of figures like A. N. Whitehead and Henri Bergson, rather than more mainstream analytic thinkers like Bertrand Russell or G. E. Moore, for inspiration. Indeed, Emmet’s ideas stand in contrast to the prevailing tides of British philosophy during her lifetime. This makes Emmet a figure of considerable historical interest; she does not fit neatly into the traditional narrative of the continental-analytic divide, proposed a way forward for metaphysics in one of its greatest times of crisis, and pre-empted certain movements in more contemporary philosophy of perception. By espousing her unique account of perception and drawing out its connections to her wider philosophy, I hope to put Emmet ‘on the map’, so to speak, of twentieth century British thought. (shrink)

Darwin proposed that evolutionary novelties are environmentally induced in organisms “constitutionally” sensitive to environmental change, with selection effective owing to the inheritance of constitutional responses. A molecular theory of inheritance, pangenesis , explained the cross‐generational transmission of environmentally induced traits, as required for evolution by natural selection. The twentieth‐century evolutionary synthesis featured mutation as the source of novelty, neglecting the role of environmental induction. But current knowledge of environmentally sensitive gene expression, combined with the idea of genetic accommodation of mutationally (...) and environmentally induced change, supports a revival of Darwin's original theory that is consistent with modern molecular and population genetics. †To contact the author, please write to: Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute, c/o Escuela de Biología, Universidad de Costa Rica, Costa Rica; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

Is it possible to compose a history of images? It is obvious that history can be composed only from that which is intrinsically historical; history has an order of its own because it interprets and clarifies an order which already exists in the facts. But is there an order in the birth, multiplication, combination, dissolution and re-synthesis of images? Mannerism had discredited or demystified form with its pretense of reproducing an order which does not exist in reality. But is the (...) world of existence, like the world of images, chaos or cosmos? Erwin Panofsky's1 great merit consists in having understood that, in spite of its confused appearance, the world of images is an ordered world and that it is possible to do the history of art as the history of images. In order to do this, he had to begin, as indeed he did, with the demonstration that classical art, in spite of the deep-rooted theoretical certitude, is also an art of the image; its forms are nothing if not images to which one tries to attribute the consistency of concepts, with the sole result of the demonstrating that even concepts are images and that the intellect is still another sector or segment of the image. · 1. See, e.g., Erwin Panofsky, Meaning in the Visual Art: Papers in and on Art History ; Studies in Iconology: Humanistic Themes in the Art of the Renaissance ; Problems in Titian, Mostly Iconographic ; Idea: Ein Beitrag zur Begriffsgeshicte der älteren Kunsttheorie [Idea: a concept in art theory, trans. Joseph J. S. Peake ]. Giulio Carlo Argan, who has seriously influenced the course of art history and criticism in postwar Italy, is professor of modern art at the University of Rome. He has written on Fra Angelico, Botticelli, Borromini, Brunelleschi, and Gropius and three volumes of critical essays on modern art. His Skira volume on Baroque art, Europe of the Capitals, is his only major work published in English. "Ideology and Iconology" originally appeared in Italian in the journal Storia dell'arte, which he edits, and in Psicon. Rebecca West, translator of this article and assistant professor of Romance Languages and Literatures at the University of Chicago, presently is collaborating on a translation of Dario Fo's theater. She has translated "Narrative Structures and Literary History" by Cesare Segre, for the Winter 1976 issue of Critical Inquiry. (shrink)

The boundaries of psychology have never been very distinctly defined and, as a consequence, science has witnessed frequent border incidents. But it obviously is not psychology alone which suffers from such lack of delineation, but its neighbors, the biological and social sciences, do as well. Cooperation between sciences becomes difficult under these conditions. All agree that psychology is the science of mind, but few agree to what “mind” is. At least within our century “mind” has been taken to be “behavior”, (...) for the present day outlook is that mind is behavior rather than that which is responsible for behavior. The metaphysical dynamism of a prime mover has been replaced by an experimental concept, i.e., one that is susceptible to scientific investigation. There is no need to review the complex history of behavioristic psychology in its many ramifications, ranging from Watson's mechanism to the various vitalistic teleologies. We turn instead to a fundamental problem on which there is little agreement: “What kind of behavior should be called mind?”. (shrink)